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Abstract
We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group
of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social
planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo
and Wettstein, 2002) but it is “smoother” in the sense that small variations in
an agent’s bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a
project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. Unlike
in the study by Pérez Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), the equilibrium outcome is
unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally,
it enables reaching an outcome as close to eﬃciency as is desired.
JEL Classification numbers: D78, D72
Keywords: mechanism design, NIMBY
∗We thank Inés Macho-Stadler, Pedro Rey-Biel and David Wettstein for helpful remarks. Part of this
research was conducted while the second author visited the Institute of Economic Analysis (IAE) and
the INRA-LAMETA. The hospitality of these institutions is greatly appreciated. David Pérez-Castrillo
acknowledges the financial support from ECO2009-7616, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-16, 2009SGR-169,
Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA and ICREA Academia. David Pérez-Castrillo is MOVE fellow.
†Dept. of Economics & CODE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona),
Spain. Email: david.perez@uab.es. Tel: +34 935811405. Fax: +34 935813767.
‡Queen’s University Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, University Sq. 25, BT7 1NN
Belfast, UK. E-mail: n.querou@qub.ac.uk. Tel: +44 2890975024. Fax: +44 2890975156
1
1 Introduction
1.1 Contribution
The design of mechanisms that help agents reach decisions on contentious issues is a
very relevant and active line of research. A mechanism that leads to an eﬃcient project
requires information about agents’ preferences for each possible decision. Themultibidding
mechanism, proposed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) allows the agents to express
their relative preference for projects. It proceeds as follows. Each agent submits a vector
of bids, one for each project, with the sole restriction that the sum of each agent’s bids
is zero. Therefore, bids measure relative rather than absolute valuation. Each agent
also nominates one of the projects specifically. The project with the highest aggregate
bid (sum of bids made for this project) is chosen. In case there is more than one such
project, there is a rule that gives priority to projects that have been nominated by some
agent. The winning project is carried out, agents pay the promised bid corresponding
to this project, and any surplus is shared among the agents, so that the mechanism is
budget-balanced.
The main property of the multibidding mechanism is that all its Nash (and strong
Nash) equilibrium outcomes are eﬃcient. However, in general environments, the mech-
anism has two weak aspects that we address in the current paper. First, it requires the
tiebreaking rule that, at equilibrium, is always used because all projects’ equilibrium ag-
gregate bids are zero. Therefore, the tiebreaking rule plays a crucial role. As Ehlers
(2009) highlights, removing the agents’ abilities to nominate one specific project and us-
ing tiebreaking rules may prevent an equilibrium from existing. Because agents do not
nominate a specific project in many real-world processes such as auctions, this lack of ro-
bustness constitutes a weakness of the initial mechanism. Second, the set of equilibrium
outcomes is quite large, as it consists of all the outcomes where each agent’s payoﬀ is at
least the expected payoﬀ he would obtain in a situation where all the projects have the
same probability of being developed. Therefore, almost any (“reasonable”) sharing of the
surplus is an equilibrium outcome.
In the present paper, we tackle the issues highlighted above by proposing a smooth
multibidding mechanism. It is close to the original proposal but ours is “smoother” in
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the sense that small variations of an agent’s bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the
probability of selecting a project. In the smooth mechanism, each agent only submits a
vector of bids, without nominating any project. All projects can be selected, with each
project’s probability being a function of its aggregate bid as well as the aggregate bids
of the rest of the projects. Projects with a negative aggregate bid have a very low, but
positive, fixed probability of being selected (a function of some parameter ). Each project
with a positive aggregate bid is selected with a probability that is a function of the level
of its (and others’) positive aggregate bid.
We first show that, for a given value of , the equilibrium outcome is unique. This
property is important because it highlights that there is no coordination issue with respect
to agents’ expectation about the final outcome. We then characterize the equilibrium
outcome. Although there may be several equilibrium strategies, the diﬀerences among
them only concern bids for those projects that, at equilibrium, end up with negative
aggregate bids. We identify the set of projects with positive equilibrium bids as well as
each agent’s bids to any project in this set. Only projects that are eﬃcient, or whose
total valuation is very close to the eﬃcient one, ultimately receive a positive aggregate
bid. In case some non-eﬃcient project receives a positive aggregate bid, its level reflects
the degree of ineﬃciency.
Second, the smooth multibidding mechanism ensures a fair share of the surplus that it
induces. Indeed, an agent’s equilibrium payoﬀ in the mechanism is the sum of the value of
the average project plus his fair share of the remaining surplus. That is, agents obtain the
same level of utility as in the original multibidding mechanism, and the surplus is divided
in equal parts among the agents. This fairness property ensures that the mechanism is
politically feasible, which is an important characteristic for practical implementation.
Third, the mechanism does not rely on the use of tiebreaking rules and is immune
to the criticism raised by Ehlers (2009). It can be thus thought of as a more natural
mechanism than the initial one.
Finally, it is apparent from the previous description that the smooth multibidding
mechanism does not achieve eﬃciency. It does, however, get as close to eﬃciency as one
wishes. We show that each agent’s expected payoﬀ increases as the value of the parameter
 decreases; therefore, total eﬃciency increases as well. Moreover, the probability of
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choosing an ineﬃcient project converges to zero as the value of the parameter  becomes
small. We can bound the level of expected ineﬃciency as a function of the parameter :
the maximum level of ineﬃciency of a project that receives a positive aggregate bid is a
linear function of the square root of .
To summarize, the present mechanism exhibits the interesting properties of uniqueness
and fairness of its equilibrium outcome. The weakness compared to the initial mechanism
(which guarantees full eﬃciency) is only minor as a social planner relying on the new
protocol would be able to get as close to full eﬃciency as she wishes. Therefore, this
mechanism constitutes an interesting option for practical implementations.
1.2 Applicability of the mechanism and related literature
There are many economic situations where this mechanism can be successfully used. A
first case concerns the complex problem of the location of noxious facilities, such as prisons,
dump sites, nuclear waste repositories, or airports. Many authors address this type of
problem; we can refer among other papers to Kunreuther and Kleindorfer, 1986; Rob,
1989; O’Sullivan, 1993; Ingberman, 1995; Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002; Minehart
and Neeman, 2002; and Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2009. Whereas the construction of
such facilities may provide large global benefits, their cost is usually borne by the hosting
agent. The sitting problems are so severe and so common that an acronym is used to
refer to them: NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard).
Another sensitive decision problem concerns the location of large international re-
search infrastructures. The decision about the city that should host such a facility is
always the subject of hot debate among the candidates and other interested countries and
institutions. In 2002, the European Commission started the European Strategy Forum on
Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) to support and facilitate multilateral initiatives leading
to a better use and development of research infrastructures, including biological archives,
communication networks, research vessels, satellite and aircraft observation facilities, tele-
scopes, synchrotrons, and particle accelerators. Although its 2006 Report presented a first
roadmap identifying 35 projects with the scientific needs for the next 10-20 years, ESFRI
is silent about how the interested countries should determine the location of the facility.
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However, this is a very diﬃcult decision that involves many scientific, economic, and social
issues. For each project, supporting countries should work out a procedure to choose the
host of the facility. Therefore, they must first decide on a mechanism and then use the
procedure to elect the hosting city.
The previous examples belong to a general class of problems in which a group of
agents has to choose one out of several projects. In some situations, the set of projects
coincides with the set of agents, as is the case if a group of municipalities meet to choose
one of them to host a dump site or a hospital. In another context, the set of agents is
larger than the set of projects, as is typically the case when countries or institutions build
a large international research infrastructure: in such a situation, all countries may not
have an own proposal regarding the specifics of the project to be carried out. The main
objective of a mechanism in such situations would be to maximize the aggregate welfare
of all the agents (eﬃciency). Moreover, such decisions typically require to compensate
(some) agents with monetary transfers. The protocol defined in the present contribution
can be considered a valuable option to be considered.
We have highlighted our contribution to the literature that oﬀers mechanisms to decide
the location of noxious facilities or any other joint decision by a group of agents. Our
proposal is also related to papers that look for mechanisms that agents can use to choose
whether to develop a project and which one to develop (see, for instance, Moulin, 1984,
and Jackson and Moulin, 1992); to reach good allocations in economic environments
with public goods and externalities (Varian, 1994a and 1994b); to dissolve a partnership
(McAfee, 1992); to sell (or not) a project to one agent when it aﬀects many (Jehiel et
al., 1996); or to award an indivisible good to one agent (in the spirit of King Solomon’s
dilemma; see, for instance, Glazer and Ma, 1989, and Perry and Reny, 1999).
Our contribution can also expand the set of applications of the multibidding mech-
anism as part of more complex mechanisms implementing solution concepts. Indeed,
variants of the multibidding mechanism (without the need to resort to the tiebreaking
rule) have been used in several environments; see Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001),
Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga (2003, 2010), Macho-Stadler et al. (2006), Porteiro (2007),
Slikker (2007), Ju et al. (2007), Kamijo (2008), Ehlers (2009), Ju and Wettstein, (2009),
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and Veszteg (2010).1
Finally, our paper can also be related to the literature on virtual (or −) implementa-
tion (Matsushima, 1988, and Abreu and Sen, 1991) in the sense that our objective is not
to achieve an exact implementation of an eﬃcient and fair outcome but to get as “close”
as wished to that allocation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the environment and the
smooth multibidding mechanism. The equilibrium strategies and outcome are stated in
Section 3. Section 4 studies the main properties of the equilibrium outcome, including
the convergence properties when the parameter  goes to zero. We provide a simple
example in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are included in
the Appendix.
2 The environment and the mechanism
We consider a set of agents  = {1     } which have to choose which project will be
carried out of a set of possible projects  = {1     }. The utility (payoﬀ) of agent  if
project  is selected is given by .
We denote by  ≡ P∈  the sum of agents’ utilities if project  is implemented.
Project  is eﬃcient if  ≥  for all  ∈ . We denote by  the set of eﬃcient projects,
that is,
 = { ∈  ≥  for all  ∈ } 
Information about all the values  is complete among the agents; that is, each agent
knows not only the value he assigns to the projects but also the values assigned by
the other agents. However, the planner does not have information about these values.
Alternatively, even if she did have some information, she would not want to use it. The
planner is interested in designing an impartial mechanism that will treat all the agents in
a symmetric manner.
We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism through which agents influence the
probability that projects are selected. We now describe the mechanism, which has a
unique stage.
1For further discussions and applications, see Pérez-Castrillo and Veszteg (2007) and Veszteg (2010).
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Each agent  ∈  makes a vector of bids  ≡ ¡¢∈ in R, one for each  in  withP
∈  = 0. All agents make their decision simultaneously. Once the agents have chosen
their bids, the outcome of the smooth multibidding mechanism is the following.
For each  ∈ ,  ≡P∈  denotes the aggregate bid for project  and ≡ ()∈
denotes the vector of aggregate bids. The probability that project  be carried out if the
vector of aggregate bids is  is
() = ()P
∈ () 
where we consider the following function ():
() =  for all   0+ for all  ≥ 0

with   0. Finally, if project  is chosen, each agent  ∈  pays his bid for that project,
, and he receives a fair share of the aggregate bid, . Therefore, agent ’s utility if
project  is implemented is
 −  + 1
The smooth multibidding mechanism borrows from the multibbiding mechanism of
Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) the idea of allowing the agents to express their rela-
tive preference for projects through a vector of bids. However, under the original mecha-
nism, the probability of selecting any project abruptly jumps from 0 to 1 as the aggregate
bid for this project just passes the maximum aggregate bid for the other projects. Under
our proposal, a higher (positive) aggregate bid for a project increases the probability that
it is selected, but the increase is “smooth”. This feature allows us to oﬀer a mechanism
that does not require ad hoc tiebreaking rules.
3 The equilibria of the smooth multibidding mecha-
nism
In this section, we characterize the Nash equilibria (NE) of the smooth multibidding
mechanism. We proceed as follows. First, we derive several properties that are necessarily
7
satisfied by NE of the game. Second, we use these properties to provide a characterization
of the set of NE.
Let us proceed now with the analysis. Consider a vector of agents’ bids ()∈ and let
 denote the set of projects for which the aggregate bid is positive under this vector of
strategies, that is,  ≡ { ∈   0}. Similarly, denote by  ≡ { ∈   0} and
 ≡ { ∈  = 0} so we have  ∪  = \. Additionally, we denote  the number
of projects in .2 The probability that project  ∈  is chosen is given by
() =
+
+∈ for all  ∈ 

+∈ for all  ∈ \
Agent  chooses his vector of bids  to maximize his expected profits given the bids
chosen by the rest of the agents. Agent ’s profits are
Π( −) =X
∈
()
∙
 −  + 1
¸

Therefore, agent  chooses  to solve the following program, which we denote by [ ]:

X
∈
()
∙
 −  + 1
¸
s.t.
X
∈
 = 0
To proceed with our analysis we note first, that agent ’s program [ ] is well behaved
except that the derivative on the right of function () with respect to  (hence, with
respect to  as well) is diﬀerent from its derivative on the left, at the point  = 0.
We introduce the First-Order Conditions (FOCs) of the program. Denoting by  the
Lagrange multiplier of the constraint, the FOC of [ ] for any  ∈  are:

 =
Π
 (
 −) +  = −(− 1) () +  = 0, (1)
where we have taken into account that () = 0 for all  ∈  and  ∈ . It is worthwhile
to notice that () is the same for all  ∈ , which supports the following property:
2Although the sets , , and  depend on the the vector of aggregate bids , we avoid using the
notations (), () (), and () for simplicity.
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increasing agent ’s bid to a project in  and decreasing another of this agent’s bids to
a diﬀerent project in  does not matter, as long as both projects still receive a negative
aggregate bid after the changes.
The FOC for any  ∈  is

 =
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− (− 1) ()+X
∈\{}
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+
X
∈\
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+  = 0 (2)
where
()
 =
( − 1)+P∈\{}¡+P∈¢2 (3)
()
 = −
+¡+P∈¢2 for all  ∈ \ {} (4)
()
 = −
¡+P∈¢2 for all  ∈ \. (5)
Finally, for any  ∈ , it needs to be the case that  ≥ 0 on the left and  ≤ 0 on
the right. In fact, the derivative on the left is the same as the left-hand side of equation
(1), which is independent of . Therefore, the derivative  ≥ 0 on the left always holds
(it holds with equality). Therefore, we only have to add the following condition:

 =
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− (− 1) ()+X
∈
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+
X
∈\(∪{})
()

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+  ≤ 0, (6)
for any  ∈  where
()
 =
( − 1)+P∈¡+P∈¢2  (7)
and () is given by (4) for any  ∈ , and it is given by (5) for any  ∈ \( ∪ ).
The previous FOCs are necessary (although not suﬃcient) to characterize the NE of
the proposed mechanism given that any equilibirum must be interior.
Next, we use the FOCs of each agent’s program to characterize the set  and the
NE aggregate and individual bids to these projects. Lemma 1 conveys useful information
about the equilibrium aggregate bids for the projects in .
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Lemma 1 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if  0 ∈  then
 = 0 + 1
(− 1) ( − 0)  (8)
Lemma 1 implies that diﬀerences in bids among those projects that receive positive
aggregate bids directly reflect the diﬀerences in total values of the projects.
We now use the previous result and the FOCs to characterize the aggregate bid received
by any project in .
Proposition 1 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if  ∈  then 
satisfies () = 0, where
() ≡ − (− 1) 2 −
"
 (− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
+
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2  (9)
We notice that the concave function () starts (at  = 0) at a positive value only if
 is close enough to the valuation of the projects in  that is, if  is high enough. The
derivative of () also depends on : it is larger when  is larger. This derivative 0()
can be positive or negative at  = 0, depending on  and it converges to −∞ as 
becomes very large. Therefore, () always crosses (once) the horizontal axis if it starts
with a positive value. We also prove in the Appendix that it never crosses the horizontal
axis if () starts at a negative value.
Before we continue the characterization of the equilibrium agents’ bids, we turn to
the analysis of the set , that is, the set of projects that receive positive aggregate bid.
Lemma 1 showed that, for projects in , aggregate bids increase with total valuation.
The same logic suggests that any project in  should have higher total valuation than
any project outside  (as they receive non-positive aggregate bids). Lemma 2 shows that
this intuition is indeed correct.
Lemma 2 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if project  satisfies  ≥ 
for some  ∈ , then  ∈ .
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We can now provide a simple condition to check whether a project receives, at equi-
librium, a positive aggregate bid. That is, Proposition 2 characterizes the set of projects
.
Proposition 2 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism,  ∈  if and only if
the following condition holds:
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2  0 (10)
where  ≡ { ∈  ≥ }.
The above result enables to conclude that the valuation of any particular project in
 cannot be too far from that of projects whose total valuation is higher. Only projects
whose total valuation is higher than the average valuation can be in  (otherwise, the
left-hand side of equation (10) is negative). Moreover, for a “better-than-average” project
to be in , it is also necessary that the sum of the diﬀerences (to the power 2) between
the value of this project and the value of the projects that are more eﬃcient should be
small enough. In particular, only eﬃcient projects will receive positive (aggregate) bids
in situations where the diﬀerence between the total values of any eﬃcient project and
the least ineﬃcient project is suﬃciently large. Finally, the set  only contains eﬃcient
projects if the parameter  is small enough.
Proposition 2 characterizes the set of projects  whose equilibrium aggregate bids
satisfy () = 0. Additionally, taking into account condition (10) and the concavity
of the function (), equation () = 0 characterizes a unique value for the aggregate
bid of any project in . On the other hand, one implication of the FOCs (specifically,
condition (1)) is that any switch in agents’ strategy concerning bids to projects outside
 is irrelevant, as long as the set  is not changed. Therefore, we already have the main
information concerning the characteristics of the NE strategies of the smooth multibbiding
mechanism. Theorem 1 provides the full description of the equilibria through a complete
characterization of the equilibrium bids.
Theorem 1 The set of bids ()∈ , with
P
∈  = 0 for all  ∈  , constitutes a NE of
the smooth multibidding mechanism if and only if it satisfies the following properties:
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(a)   0 if and only if  − P∈  − 1(−1)P∈ ( − )2  0
(b) () = 0 whenever   0
(c)  = + 1− 1
P
∈ − 1
³
 − 1
P
∈ 
´
for all  ∈  whenever   0, and
(d)  ≥  +  + −1  − 1
P
∈  − 1( − 1
P
∈ ) for all  ∈  and any given
project  ∈ , whenever  ≤ 0.
There is an intuitive progression from the first to the last property in the above
theorem. Property () provides a way to check which projects will receive positive bids.
Property () then characterizes the aggregate bids of such projects. Property () uses ()
to characterize the corresponding individual bids. Finally, property () follows from ()
and provides a lower bound on the individual bids for projects whose aggregate bid is non
positive.
There are three important remarks regarding the last property. First, property ()
prevents any agent from having incentives to increase his bid for a project whose aggregate
bid is non positive. Second, the statement of this property is actually independent from
the specific choice of project  ∈  since the diﬀerence −1  − 1 is independent from
this choice. Third, property () is stronger that the FOC (6) as it concerns not only
projects in  but also in . Therefore, not all strategies that satisfy the FOCs constitute
a NE.
Theorem 1 enables us to construct a particular vector of bids that satisfy conditions
() and (), which also shows that the set of  of the smooth multibidding mechanism
is always non empty:
Proposition 3 The set of  of the smooth multibidding mechanism is non empty. In
particular, the following set of bids ()∈ is a :
(I)  is constructed using () and (), for all  ∈ , where  is the non-empty set that
satisfies condition ();
(II)  =  + −1  − 1
P
∈  − 1( − 1
P
∈ ) for all  ∈ \ ( ∪ {}), where 
is a particular element of \;
(III)  = −
P
∈\ .
Therefore, we have an easy way to construct a  for any environment. The proof of
12
Proposition 3 only requires that condition () is also satisfied for the particular project
 ∈ \.
The characterization of equilibrium bids is an important point of the analysis, but we
have little information on the practical properties satisfied by the mechanism (in terms
of equilibrium payoﬀs, degree of eﬃciency). These properties will be provided in the next
section.
4 Properties of the smooth multibidding mechanism
In the present section we provide several properties satisfied by the equilibrium outcome
of the proposed mechanism. First, we highlight that each agent’s equilibrium payoﬀ
satisfies a fairness property. Second, we show that the optimal payoﬀs resulting from the
mechanism increase monotonically as the value of the parameter  decreases. Third, we
provide an upper bound on the degree of potential ineﬃciency that could arise in a project
in the set , and we prove that the mechanism converges to full eﬃciency as the value of
the parameter  becomes small.
4.1 Fairness of equilibrium payoﬀs
We start with the characterization of the agents’ equilibrium payoﬀs.
Proposition 4 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, agent ’s profits are
Π = 1
X
∈
 + 1
"X
∈
() − 1
X
∈

#

The above equality highlights that an agent’s equilibrium payoﬀ is made of two parts.
The first part amounts to the value of the average project, 1
P
∈ . This would corre-
spond to the payoﬀ associated with the random assignment mechanism, that is, a mech-
anism that would choose any project with the same probability. We notice that this
mechanism is a benchmark that is used often in practical situations. It basically cor-
responds to a process where agents would “throw a die” to determinate which specific
project would be implemented in case they would be indiﬀerent between all the potential
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projects. It is also the utility level that each agent can secure himself when he plays the
multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002). The second part of the
equilibrium payoﬀ is the fair share of the surplus. Therefore, not only is the equilibrium
payoﬀ of the smooth multibidding mechanism unique (in contrast with the multibidding
mechanism, whose outcome set can be large) but it also implies a fair share of the surplus
(i.e., the additional payoﬀ obtained with respect of the average value of the projects).
One implication of Proposition 4 is that agents’ interests are aligned: when one agent’s
payoﬀ increases, the payoﬀs of the other agents also increase. Therefore, there is no conflict
between total profits and individual profits.
4.2 Monotonicity of equilibrium payoﬀs
The characterization of the agents’ expected payoﬀs obtained in the previous sub-section
is also useful because it enables us to check whether the parameter  has a monotone
eﬀect on the optimal payoﬀs. Intuitively, one would think that payoﬀs should increase
with a decrease in the value of the parameter. This is confirmed by the next result.
Proposition 5 Any agent’s optimal expected profits increase with a decrease in the value
of the parameter .
A smaller value of  leads to a higher eﬃciency level attained by the mechanism and
each agent having higher expected payoﬀs. This provides a clear implication for a practical
implementation of the mechanism: the value of the parameter  should be positive and
chosen as small as possible, as this would ensure that the agents’ expected payoﬀs will
come close to their highest possible values.
It is important to notice that we have not yet proved that choosing the parameter
 as small as possible would ensure that the mechanism comes as close as possible to
full eﬃciency. This will be proved in the final sub-section, where we first highlight two
additional properties.
14
4.3 Convergence of the mechanism to full eﬃciency
Before analyzing the convergence of the outcome of the mechanism to full eﬃciency, it
is interesting to characterize the degree of ineﬃciency that can be sustained in projects
with positive equilibrium aggregate bids. The next result provides an upper bound on
this degree of ineﬃciency.
Proposition 6 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, for any  ∈ , the
following inequality holds:
 ∗ − √ ∗ ≤
p
(− 1) ( − 1)√
where  ∗ denotes the value of an eﬃcient project.
Proposition 6 implies that the potential degree of ineﬃciency of any project with
positive aggregate bid at equilibrium is a linear function of the square root of . There-
fore, the mechanism will only select eﬃcient projects for situations where the degree of
heterogeneity in the value of the projects is suﬃciently large. As soon as the diﬀerence
between the value of an eﬃcient project  and that of a second-best project  is large
enough, then the mechanism will select eﬃcient projects only. Moreover, as the value of
the parameter  becomes arbitrarily small the degree of heterogeneity required converges
to zero. Therefore, small values of  will ensure that the outcome implemented by the
mechanism approximates full eﬃciency. This is consistent with the conclusion resulting
from the monotonicity of the agents’ expected payoﬀs as described in Proposition 5.
Next, we provide additional information on the agents’ optimal bids when all selected
projects are eﬃcient. In such a situation, the optimal aggregate bids can be easily char-
acterized, as highlighted by the following result.
Proposition 7 In any NE of the smooth multibidding mechanism, if  =  then
 =
− +
r
22 + 4 
(−1)
³
 −P∈ ´
2
for any  ∈ . Moreover,  converges to 0 and () converges to 1 as  tends towards
0.
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When only eﬃcient projects are selected by the mechanism, the form of the aggregate
bids is simple. According to this expression, the aggregate bid will be higher as the
diﬀerence between the value of an eﬃcient project and those of the other projects increases.
Moreover, all eﬃcient projects will be selected with equal probability approximately equal
to 1 as the parameter  becomes arbitrarily small. In particular, the probability that an
eﬃcient project is selected converges to 1 as  tends toward 0.
Propositions 6 and 7 enable us to provide a final result on the relative eﬃciency of the
mechanism as the value of the parameter  becomes small. Specifically, we show that, for
any equilibrium, the probability of implementing an ineﬃcient project converges to zero.
Therefore, the outcome of the mechanism gets as close to eﬃciency as one wishes as the
parameter  tends towards zero.
Proposition 8 The outcome of the smooth multibidding mechanism converges to full
eﬃciency as the parameter  converges to zero. In other words, if project  ∈  denotes
an ineﬃcient project, its probability to be implemented at the equilibrium converges to zero
as  becomes small.
The above result confirms that the eﬀect of a variation of the parameter  is intuitive.
Regarding the actual implementation of the mechanism, small values of this parameter
will ensure that the chance of choosing an ineﬃcient project comes close to zero.
5 Example
Before concluding the paper, it might be useful to highlight the main properties of the
mechanism with a simple example. Let us consider the following situation.
Two agents (1 and 2) have to make a collective decision on the implementation of a
project. There are four potential choices corresponding to the set  = {1 2 3 4} where
the agents’ benefits are: 11 = 6, 21 = 3; 12 = 4, 22 = 6; 13 = 2, 23 = 1; and 14 = 8,
24 = 2, respectively. The weighting parameter  is positive; we will highlight how its value
influences the outcome of the mechanism.
At equilibrium of the smooth multibidding mechanism, Project 3 will receive a negative
aggregate bid for any possible  (this follows from Theorem 1 (a)). Project 1 will also
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receive negative aggregate bid as soon as   12. In this case, Proposition 7 provides
the expression for the aggregate bids of projects 2 and 4 (the eﬃcient projects):
2 = 4 = −+
√2 + 4  0
and Theorem 1 (c) enables one to find the equilibrium individual bids for projects 1 and
2. For example, the bids that agents submit for project 2 are
12 = −2 + 12
h
−+√2 + 4
i
22 = 2 + 12
h
−+√2 + 4
i
.
The probability that projects 2 and 4 are selected at equilibrium is
2() = 4() =
√
4 + 
2
£√+√4 + ¤ 
therefore, each 2() and 4() converges to 12 as  converges to zero.
Finally, regarding the agents’ equilibrium payoﬀs, we know from Proposition 4 that,
for instance, agent 1’s payoﬀ is given by the following expressions:
Π1 = 5 + 1
2
"
1£√+√4 + ¤ ³10√4 + + 6√´− 8
#
which corresponds to this agent’s value of the average project (5) plus his fair share of
the collective benefits. The collective benefits converge towards the total value 10 of an
eﬃcient project minus the total value of the average project 8. Therefore, Π1 converges
to 6 as  converges to 0.
6 Conclusion
Relying on the main characteristics of the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and
Wettstein, 2002), we developed a new procedure for choosing eﬃcient projects in situations
where the social planner does not have information on the agents’ preferences.
Even though the present protocol does not achieve eﬃciency, it has a number of inter-
esting properties compared to the mechanism developed in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2002). That is, it implements a unique equilibrium outcome, satisfies a fairness property
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and is immune to the problems highlighted by Ehlers (2009) as the use of tiebreaking rules
is avoided (by making the probability to select a given project continuous). Moreover, it
may come as close to full eﬃciency as the social planner wishes.
As uniqueness and fairness of the resulting outcome are important properties for prac-
tical implementation (among other things, fairness ensures that the mechanism will be
politically feasible), this mechanism may be considered a valuable tool for such problems
of collective decision making.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume  contains at least two projects, otherwise the lemma
holds trivially. The derivative of the payoﬀ to any agent , when adding an infinitesimal
 to  and substracting  from 0 is
1¡+P∈¢
∙
 −  + 1
¸
− (− 1)
(+)¡+P∈¢−
1¡+P∈¢
∙
0 − 0 + 10
¸
+
(− 1)

(+0)¡+P∈¢ 
The previous derivative must be zero at the optimum, that is,
 −  − (− 2)  = 
0 − 0 − (− 2) 0. (11)
Summing over  we get − (− 1) = 0 − (− 1)0, which is equivalent to (8).
Proof of Proposition 1. The FOC for any  ∈  implies  = (−1) (+∈) .
Therefore, we write the FOC with respect to  ∈  (equation (2)) as (after easy simplifi-
cations)
1¡+P∈¢2
"Ã
+X
∈

!∙
 −  + 1
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1
¸#
−
¡+P∈¢2
X
∈
 − (− 1)
¡+P∈¢ = 0 (12)
or Ã
+X
∈

!∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
 = 0 (13)
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Summing (13) over  ∈  we obtainÃ
+X
∈

!
[ − (− 1)]−
X
∈
 − 
X
∈
 = 0
i.e.,
 − 
X
∈
 −  (− 1) +
X
∈
 ( − )− (− 1)
X
∈
 = 0 (14)
Note that we can write the last two terms in (14) as
X
∈
 [( − )− (− 1)] = − 1− 1
X
∈
[( − )− (− 1)]2 =
− 1− 1
X
∈
( − )2 − (− 1) 2 + 2 − 2
X
∈
,
where we have used equation (8). Therefore, (14) can be written as () = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, suppose\ contains at least two projects. Take projects
 ∈ \ and  ∈  satisfying  ≥ . We know that for any agent  ∈  , changes in¡¢∈\ do not influence his profits as long as  ≤ 0 for all  ∈ \ is maintained.
Therefore, if   0 then agent  can increase  to  =  −  and decrease  to
 =  +  for some other  ∈ \. The derivative of the payoﬀ to any agent , when
adding a positive infinitesimal  to  and substracting  from  is
1¡+P∈¢ £ − ¡ −¢¤− (− 1) ¡+P∈¢−
1¡+P∈¢
∙
 −  + 1
¸
+
(− 1)

(+)¡+P∈¢ 
The previous derivative can not be positive at the optimum, that is,£ −  +¤− ∙ −  − (− 2) 
¸
≤ 0 for all  ∈  .
Summing the previous equation over  , we get
 −  + (− 1) ≤ 0. (15)
However, the last inequality cannot hold if  ≥  and   0
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Second, suppose \ = {} and pick  such that  is the lowest among the elements
in . Taking into account that  ≤ , then  ≤  for all  ∈ . For this project ,
0() |=0= −
"
 (− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
≤ − (− 1)  0
and
() |=0=  − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 ≤ 0.
Therefore,   0 is not possible.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first prove by contradiction that project  does not
belong to  if (10) does not hold. We know that, according to Lemma 2,  ⊂  if  ∈ .
Denote by  the project in  with the lowest total valuation:  ≤  for all  ∈ . Then
() |=0=  − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 ≤
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
2X
∈
( − ) ≤ 0
Also, 0() |=0= −
£ (− 1) + 2P∈  − 2¤  0 which, together with 00() 
0 implies that ()  0 for all positive . However, this is not possible at equilibrium.
Second, we prove that (10) does not hold if  ∈ \. Note that (10) cannot happen
for  if {} = \. Therefore, we take  ∈ \ and and suppose that there are at least
two projects outside . Consider some  ∈ . By the same calculations as in the proof
of Lemma 2, we obtain (see (15))  −  + (− 1) ≤ 0, that is,  ≤ 1(−1) ( − ) 
or, () |= 1(−1) (−)≤ 0 This is equivalent to
−  1
(− 1) ( − )
2 − 1
(− 1)
"
 (− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
( − )+
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 ≤ 0, (16)
i.e.,
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 − 2
(− 1)
X
∈
 ( − )+
2
(− 1) ( − )−
1
(− 1) ( − )
2 ≤ 0
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Using that− ( − )2−2 ( − ) = − 2 − 2 +2 and 2 ( − )−( − )2 =
 2 −  2 , the previous inequality is equivalent to
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
2 − 1(− 1)
X
∈
 2 + 2(− 1)
X
∈
+
1
(− 1)
2 − 1(− 1)
2 ≤ 0
i.e.,
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 ≤ 0 (17)
Given that  ⊃  for any  ∈ , it is necessarily the case that equation (10) cannot
hold, as we wanted to prove.
Proof of Theorem 1. The necessity of parts () and () comes from propositions 1
and 2. For part (), note that from (11), we know that
 −  + 1 = 
 −  + 1 +
(− 1)
 ( −)
for any   ∈ . Therefore, we can write (12) asÃ
+X
∈

!∙
 −  + 1
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1 +
(− 1)
 ( −)
¸
−
X
∈
 − − 1 
Ã
+X
∈

!
= 0,
i.e.,

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
 − 1
"
(− 1)X
∈
2 +  (− 1)
#
= 0 (18)
We use (8) to show that
X
∈
2 =
X
∈
∙
 + 1
(− 1) ( − )
¸2
=
2 + 2(− 1)
X
∈
 − 2
(− 1) +
1
(− 1)2
X
∈
( − )2 
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Therefore, (18) is equivalent to

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
−
1

"
(− 1) 2 + 2
X
∈
 − 2 + 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 +  (− 1)
#
= 0
and, using that () = 0, we obtain

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
 − 1
"
 − 
X
∈

#
= 0,
and part () follows. For part (), from the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma
3, it follows that, for any agent , any project  ∈  and any  ∈  we have

 =
1¡+P∈¢ £ − ¤− 1¡+P∈¢
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
≤ 0
as agents do not have incentives to deviate. This implies the following inequality:
 −  −
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
≤ 0 (19)
Using () and rewriting, we check that part () follows for any  ∈ . Part () is also
implied by () for any  ∈  when \ is a singleton, \ = {}, using  = −P∈ .
Finally, when \ contains at least two projects, any agent can unilaterally amend his
bids regarding the projects in to make any project with an initially negative aggregate
bid get one equal to zero. Moreover, the resulting situation is payoﬀ equivalent to the
initial one. This implies that condition (19) must hold for all projects  ∈  once we
increase  to  so that the  = 0, that is,  =  −. Therefore, condition (d) must
hold.
We now show that () to () are also suﬃcient conditions for NE. Consider any vector
of bids ()∈ satisfying () to (). We will prove that ()∈ is indeed a NE by showing
that  is a best response to −.
Any best response  to − must satisfy the FOCs. We denote by  = +P∈\ 
for any  ∈  and by ,  the set and number corresponding to the vector of bids
( −). Following the same calculations as in the proof of Lemma 1, FOCs imply
 −  − (− 2)  = 
0 − 0 − (− 2) 0 for any  
0 ∈ . (20)
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Also, when\ has at least two elements, calculations similar to those in Lemma 2 imply
 −  + ≤ 0 − 0 − (− 2) 0 for any  ∈ \ 
0 ∈ . (21)
When \ only contains one element, that is, \ = {} for some  ∈ , then (21)
also holds as it is implied by (20). Indeed, summing (20) over  ∈ \ and taking into
account that  = −P∈  and  = −P∈, we obtainX
∈
 +  + (− 2)  = ( − 1)
0 − ( − 1)0 − ( − 1)(− 2) 0 for any 
0 ∈ ,
that is,
 −  + = 0 − 0 − (− 2) 0+X
∈
 + 2(− 1)  − 
0 + 0 +  (− 2) 0 for any 
0 ∈ .
Therefore, (21) holds if
0 − 0 + 10 ≥
1

X
∈
 + (− 1)
∙
2
 +0
¸
for some 0 ∈ 
Since  = −P∈\, it is necessarily the case that 2+0 ≤ 0 for some 0 ∈ \.
Moreover, 0 − 0 + 10 ≥ 1
P
∈  for any 0 ∈ \.3 Therefore, (21) also holds for
 when \ = {}.
Now, we take any 0 ∈  and rewrite (20) and (21) as
 +
X
∈\
 − (2− 2)  = 
0 +
X
∈\
0 − (2− 2) 0 for any  
0 ∈ , (22)
 +
X
∈\
 ≤ 0 +
X
∈\
 − (2− 2) 0 for any  ∈ \ 
0 ∈ . (23)
3Any best response  must ensure expected profits higher or equal than 1
P
∈ , which is
the level that agent  can secure with the “safe” strategy  = −
P
∈\  : profits under  are
1

P
∈
£ − ¤ = 1P∈  because  = 0 for all  ∈ . Therefore, all the projects  ∈ 
must provide this level of profits in case they are chosen; otherwise, agent  would decrease all the bids
on those projects which provide less profits (he would also increase , still ensuring that  is negative);
this would increase the probability of success of those projects whose profits in case there are chosen is
higher or equal than 1
P
∈ .
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Equation (23) is a necessary condition for  to be in \. Similarly, because  is
positive if  ∈ , a necessary condition for  to be in  is (following (22))
 +
X
∈\
  0 +
X
∈\
0 − (2− 2) 0  (24)
Therefore, if 0 ∈ , then  ∈  if and only if (24) holds. Equation (24) implies that if
0 ∈ , then  ∈  if +P∈\  is larger than 0 +P∈\ 0. An implication is that
 ∈  if and only if  +P∈\  is larger than some threshold. Also notice that this is
also necessarily true for the set  (possibly with a diﬀerent threshold). Therefore, either
 ⊂  or  ⊂ .
We go back to (20), which we rewrite as (25)
(2− 2)

¡0 − ¢ = 0 −  − (− 2) X∈\
¡0 − ¢ for any  0 ∈ . (25)
Taking into account that (25) also holds for  (instead of ) if  0 ∈ , then
0 −  = 0 −  for any  0 ∈  ∩, (26)
that is,  =  +  (and also  =  + ), for some  ∈ R, for all  ∈  ∩.
Take some  ∈ . The FOC with respect to  is (see (13))
⎛
⎝+X
∈

⎞
⎠
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
 = 0 (27)
First, suppose that  ≤ 0 Then, (24) is more limiting for  than for ; therefore,  ⊂ .
Equation (27) becomes
⎛
⎝+X
∈
 + 
⎞
⎠
∙
 −  − (− 2)  − 2
(− 1)
 
¸
−
X
∈
( + )
∙
 −  + 1 −
(− 1)
 
¸
− X
∈
 = 0
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which we write asÃ
+X
∈

!∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
−
⎛
⎝ X
∈\

⎞
⎠
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
+
X
∈\

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+

⎛
⎝
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
− 2(− 1)
⎛
⎝+X
∈

⎞
⎠−X
∈
∙
 −  + 1
¸
+
(− 1)

X
∈

⎞
⎠+
2
µ
−2(− 1) + 
(− 1)

¶
= 0 (28)
The sum of the first three terms in (28) is equal to zero, as it corresponds to the FOC of
. Then after some calculations, (28) becomes
−
⎛
⎝(− 1) [ ( + ) + 2+
X
∈
] +
X
∈
µ∙
 −  + 1
¸
−
∙
 −  + 1
¸¶⎞
⎠ +
X
∈\

µ∙
 −  + 1
¸
−
∙
 −  + 1
¸¶
+
⎛
⎝ X
∈\

⎞
⎠ (− 1)  = 0 (29)
We notice that because of condition (), £ −  + 1¤− £ −  + 1¤ = 1 [ − ]
for any   ∈  (in particular, this is also true if   ∈ ). Moreover, Lemma 1 implies
that  −  + (− 1) = (− 1) or any   ∈ . Therefore, (29) can be written as
(− 1)

X
∈\
2 − (− 1)
⎡
⎣ + 2+ 2X
∈

⎤
⎦  = 0 (30)
The first term in (30) is non-negative; in fact, it is zero if and only if \ is empty.
Moreover,  + 2 + 2P∈ is positive. Taking into account that  ≤ 0, (29) only
holds if \ is empty, that is,  =  and  = 0.
Second, suppose that  ≥ 0, which implies (following (24)) that  ⊃ . We take
 ∈  and we rewrite (27):
⎛
⎝+X
∈
 +  +
X
∈\

⎞
⎠
∙
 −  − (− 2)  − 2
(− 1)
 
¸
−
X
∈
( + )
∙
 −  + 1 −
(− 1)
 
¸
− X
∈\

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
 = 0
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i.e.,Ã
+X
∈

!∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
−X
∈

∙
 −  + 1
¸
− X
∈
−
⎛
⎝ X
∈\

⎞
⎠
∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
− X
∈\

∙
 −  + 1
¸
+

∙
 −  − (− 2)  − 2
(− 1)
 
¸
 − 2(− 1)
Ã
+X
∈

!
−
X
∈
∙
 −  + 1 −
(− 1)
 
¸
 = 0 (31)
which, because  ∈ , and after following steps similar to those in the first case, givesX
∈\

µ∙
 −  − (− 2) 
¸
−
∙
 −  − (− 2)  +
(− 1)
 
¸¶
−
(− 1)

"
 + 2+X
∈

#
 = 0 (32)
Using (20), we deduce that the first term is equal to − (−1)
P
∈\. Therefore,
taking into account that  ≥ 0, (32) only holds if  =  and  = 0.
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that  satisfies condition ()
 = −
X
∈\
 = −
X
∈
 −
X
∈\(∪{})
 =
−X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 + 
X
∈
 + 1
X
∈
 − 1


X
∈
−
X
∈\(∪{})
 −
X
∈\(∪{})
 − (− − 1)
"
(− 1)
  −
1

X
∈
 − 1 +
1

X
∈

#

Therefore,  ≥  +  + −1  − 1
P
∈  − 1( − 1
P
∈ ) if and only if
−1
X
∈
 −
X
∈\
 − ( − )(− 1)  −
1

X
∈
 + 1
X
∈
 + ( − ) 1 ≥ 0
which, after easy calculations, gives
1

X
∈\
[ −  − (− 1) − (− 1)] ≥ 0 (33)
26
Notice that the previous inequality is independent of  and holds if −−(− 1) ≥ 0
for all  ∈ \ (as  ≤ 0 for  ∈ \), that is, if 
³
1
(−1) ( − )
´
≤ 0 (where we
take the function () corresponding to project ). Therefore, (33) holds if equation (16)
is satisfied. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have shown that (16) is equivalent to (17):
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2 ≤ 0
Equation (17) holds for the project with the highest  among the projects in\, as, for
this project,
P
∈ ( − )2 =
P
∈ ( − )2 and (17) is equivalent to the condition
that  does not belong to . Additionally,  −  − (− 1) ≥ 0 as well for the other
projects whose  is smaller. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Denote   = 1
(+∈)
the probability that any of the
projects outside  is selected. Using Theorem 1, we derive:
Π =X
∈
()
∙
 −  + 1
¸
=
X
∈
()
"
1

X
∈
 + 1
Ã
 − 1
X
∈

!#
+   X
∈\
∙
 −  + 1
¸
 (34)
We elaborate on the second term of (34), also using Theorem 1:X
∈\
∙
 −  + 1
¸
=
X
∈\
 +
X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 =
X
∈\
 +
X
∈
 + 1
X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 + 1
1

X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 =
( − )

X
∈
 − 1
X
∈
 + 1
1

X
∈

Therefore,
Π =X
∈
()1
X
∈
 + 1
X
∈
() − 1
X
∈
()
X
∈
+
  ( − )
X
∈
 −   1
X
∈
 +   1
1

X
∈

Using ( − )  +P∈ () = 1, we obtain
Π = 1
X
∈
 − 1
1

X
∈
 + 1
X
∈
() −   1
X
∈
 +   1
1

X
∈
,
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which, after simplification, is the expression in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Given Proposition 4, Proposition 5 is equivalent to the
property that the function  () ≡ P∈ ((); ) is decreasing with . We rewrite
the continuously diﬀerentiable function  () as
 () =X
∈
[+()]£+P∈()¤ +
X
∈\
£+P∈()¤
We deduce that 0() is the same for any  ∈  from Lemma 1, and we denote such a
derivative by 0(). Then the sign of  0() is the same as that of the following expression:X
∈
()
X
∈
+0()
X
∈
+0()
X
∈
()
X
∈
−
X
∈
()−0()
X
∈
−
0()X
∈
() +
"X
∈
()− 0()
# X
∈\

which, after some easy calculations, can be written as
() ≡
"X
∈
[()− 0()]
#⎡
⎣ X
∈\
 − ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦+
∙
0() + 
¸"X
∈
()
X
∈
 − 
X
∈
()
#

We now analyze the sign of the four elements of ().
First,
P
∈\ − (−)
P
∈   0 given that    for every  ∈  and  ∈ \.
Second, using Lemma 1 and denoting by () and  ∗ the aggregate bid and the value
of any project in , we findX
∈
()
X
∈
 − 
X
∈
() =
X
∈
∙
()− (
∗ − )
(− 1)
¸X
∈
−
X
∈
∙
()− (
∗ − )
(− 1)
¸
 =
X
∈

X
∈
−
X
∈
 2 ≤ 0
where the inequality is strict whenever  is larger than  and the proof of the inequality
can be easily done by induction.
Third, we prove that 0() +   0. Using Proposition 1 we obtain
() = −(− 1)− [2
P
∈  − 2] +
p∆()
2(− 1)
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where
∆() =
"
(− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#2
+4(−1)
"
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2
#

Therefore,
0()+ =
1
2(− 1)
"
−(− 1) + 1
2
∆0() 1p∆()
#
+

 =

2+
1
4(− 1)∆
0() 1p∆()  0
since
∆0() = 2(− 1)
"
(− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
+ 4(− 1)
"
 −
X
∈

#
=
22(− 1)2 + 4(− 1)
"
X
∈
 − 
X
∈

#
 0,
because the average value of  in  is higher than (or equal to) that of  in .
Finally, we check whether
P
∈ [()− 0()]  0. The inequality is equivalent to
X
∈
Ã
−(− 1)− [2X
∈
 − 2] +
q
∆()− 
"
−(− 1) + 1
2
∆0() 1p∆()
#!
 0
i.e.,
X
∈
"
−2[X
∈
 − ] +
q
∆()− ∆
0()
2
p∆()
#
=
X
∈
1p∆()
∙
∆()− 1
2
∆0()
¸
 0
which, given that
p∆()  0 for all  ∈  holds if and only if ∆()−12∆0()  0, i.e.,"
(− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#2
+4(−1)
"
 − 
X
∈
 − 1
(− 1)
X
∈
( − )2
#
−
(− 1)
"
(− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
− 2(− 1)
"
 −
X
∈

#
="
2
X
∈
 − 2
#"
(− 1) + 2X
∈
 − 2
#
−4X
∈
(−)2+2(−1)
"
 −
X
∈

#
=
2(− 1)
"
X
∈
 − 
X
∈

#
+ 4
⎡
⎣
ÃX
∈

!2
− X
∈
()2
⎤
⎦  0 (35)
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which is independent of .
If (35) is satisfied then we conclude that  − 0  0, which implies that  0()  0,
and Proposition 5 is proven. −0  0 holds, for example, when  =  (in which case,
the second term is zero), but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. Now, suppose that
 − 0 ≤ 0, that is,

"
X
∈
 − 
X
∈

#
≤ 2− 1
⎡
⎣X
∈
()2 −
ÃX
∈

!2⎤
⎦  (36)
We then rewrite () as:
() =X
∈
()
⎡
⎣ X
∈\
 − ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦+
0()
⎡
⎣− X
∈\
 + ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦+
∙
0() + 
¸⎡
⎣
ÃX
∈

!2
− X
∈
()2
⎤
⎦ 
It is easily checked that the following equality holds:

⎡
⎣− X
∈\
 + ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦ = ( − )X
∈
 − 
X
∈\
 = 
X
∈
 − 
X
∈

Plugging this last equality into the expression of () and then using (36), we conclude
that the following inequality is satisfied:
() ≤X
∈
()
⎡
⎣ X
∈\
 − ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦+
0() 2
(− 1)
"
X
∈
()2 −
ÃX
∈

!#
+
∙
0() + 
¸⎡
⎣
ÃX
∈

!2
− X
∈
()2
⎤
⎦ =
X
∈
()
⎡
⎣ X
∈\
 − ( − )
X
∈

⎤
⎦+ 
⎡
⎣
ÃX
∈

!2
− X
∈
()2
⎤
⎦+
0()
"
X
∈
()2 − (
X
∈
)2
# ∙
2
− 1 − 1
¸

We already checked that the first two terms of the last expression are negative. We thus
can conclude that the sign of () (and that of  0()) is negative if the last term of the
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expression is non positive. Provided that  ≥ 3 this is always satisfied. Finally, notice
that for  = 2 and  6=  (if  =  we already know that  0()  0) P∈\  −
(−)

P
∈  = 0; therefore  0()  0 if and only if
∙
0() + 
¸"X
∈
()
X
∈
 − 
X
∈
()
#
 0
which always holds. We can thus conclude the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Following Proposition 2, for any  ∈  the value  satisfies:
(− 1)
"
 −
X
∈

#
−X
∈
( − )2  0
which, denoting as  ∗ the value of an eﬃcient project, implies that
(− 1)
"
 −
X
∈

#
− ( ∗ − )2 =
− 2 + [2 ∗ + ( − 1)(− 1)] −
⎡
⎣(− 1) X
∈{}
 +  ∗2
⎤
⎦  0 (37)
The left-hand side of (37) is a polynomial expression of degree two. Let us denote
∆ ≡ [2 ∗ + ( − 1)(− 1)]2 − 4
⎡
⎣(− 1) X
∈{}
 +  ∗2
⎤
⎦ =
( − 1)(− 1)
⎛
⎝4
⎡
⎣( − 1) ∗ − X
∈{}

⎤
⎦+ 1
⎞
⎠ 
One can notice that ∆ is positive, as  ∗ ≥  for any project . This implies that
condition (37) (which holds for any  ∈ ) is equivalent to the property that  lies in
the interval :
 ≡
#
 ∗ + ( − 1)(− 1)
2
−
√∆
2
  ∗ + ( − 1)(− 1)
2
+
√∆
2
"

We write the condition  ≥  ∗ + (−1)(−1)2 −
√∆
2
as
 ∗ −  ≤  ≡
√∆
2
− ( − 1)(− 1)
2

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Bound  can be rewritten as follows:
 = ( − 1)(− 1)
2
⎡
⎢⎣
vuuut 4( − 1)2(− 1)
⎡
⎣( − 1) ∗ − X
∈{}

⎤
⎦+ 1− 1
⎤
⎥⎦ ≤
( − 1)(− 1)
2
vuuut 4( − 1)2(− 1)
⎡
⎣( − 1) ∗ − X
∈{}

⎤
⎦ ≤
 ≡ ( − 1)(− 1)
2
s
4
( − 1)2(− 1)( − 1) ∗
Therefore,  ∗ −  ≤  , which gives the expression stated in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 7. The expression for  follows immediately from () = 0
once we take into account that  =  for any   ∈  when  = . It is also immediate
that  converges to 0 as  tends towards 0. Finally,
() = ++P∈ = 1
(2− )+
r
22 + 4 
(−1)
³
 −P∈ ´
+
r
22 + 4 
(−1)
³
 −P∈ ´ 
which converges to 1 as  tends towards 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let  ∈  denote a second-best project and  ≡  ∗−  0
denote the diﬀerence between the value of an eﬃcient project and that of . We have
 ∗− ∗ =

 ∗  0 Let us consider that the parameter  takes values such that
 
³ 
 ∗
´2 1
(− 1)( − 1) 
Then, by Proposition 6 we deduce that project  does not belong to  for the above
values of the parameter , which implies that any ineﬃcient project is in \ as well.
Therefore, for small enough values of ,  =  and, according to Proposition 7, the
probability of selecting an eﬃcient project converges to 1 as the parameter  tends to
zero, which ensures convergence to an eﬃcient outcome as  tends to zero.
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